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Earmarking of pollution charges and the sub-
optimality of the Pigouvian tax
{
Tingsong Jiang*
One approach to internalising a negative externality of economic activity is to
impose a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal cost of the externality. However, this
approach overlooks the possibility that the tax revenue can be earmarked to
correct the externality directly, i.e. ¢nancing the environmental protection projects.
It is found that a pure Pigouvian tax is usually not an optimal policy. This issue
is examined in both partial and general equilibrium, static and dynamic settings.
Certain conditions for justifying a pure Pigouvian tax or a fully earmarked tax
scheme are developed.
1. Introduction
One of the textbook approaches to internalise a negative externality of
economic activities is to impose the so-called Pigouvian tax on such
activities. The standard Pigouvian solution calls for `a tax (subsidy) per unit
on the externality-generating activity equal to its marginal external damage
(bene¢t)' (Baumol and Oates 1988, p. 55). However, this standard version of
the Pigouvian tax overlooks the question of how the tax revenue is used.
Some economists propose the use of such revenues in correcting pre-existing
distortions. This idea is called the `double-dividend hypothesis', and suggests
that increased taxes on polluting activities can improve environmental
quality and simultaneously enhance economic e¤ciency through reducing
distorting taxes (Pearce 1991).
1 However, no-one has examined earmarking
of the tax revenue for environmental projects.
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1Fullerton and Metcalf (1997) argue that if the tax only replaces current command and
control regulations, there is no ¢rst dividend. Goulder et al. (1996) point out that the second
dividend is not generally guaranteed, because the revenue-recycling e¡ect may well beThis is surprising because it is a common approach in practice. Examples
are the Superfund in the United States, the pollution levy system in China,
and pollution fee schedules in some European countries. It is even more
surprising because in his classic work The Economics of Welfare, Pigou
(1920) presented at least two di¡erent revenue schemes. On the one hand, he
assumed externality taxes were ¢scal taxes equivalent to the damage
imposed; on the other hand, he indicated that they were to be earmarked for
a special purpose. In his later work (Pigou 1928), he clari¢es that the
taxation of negative externalities raises revenue to be spent on the provision
of positive externalities. Strangely, many environmental economists neglect
this aspect of Pigou's argument, although they often assign his name to
a pollution charge. Perhaps Mikael Skou Andersen (1994) is the only
exception.
According to the above discussion, at least three taxation programs are
to hand. First, under a pure pollution tax scheme, suggested by the con-
ventional Pigouvian tax, the revenue from pollution taxes is used as a
transfer to the public, with no spending on the environment. Second, and in
contrast, a (fully) earmarked pollution levy scheme uses all revenue for
environmental purposes. Finally, a general tax-income scheme does not
impose any prior restrictions on spending.
This article attempts to examine these arrangements in both partial and
general equilibrium settings, and to ¢nd the optimal pollution tax scheme. It
is found that the usual Pigouvian tax might not be optimal if the possibility
of earmarking is considered. It also provides a theoretical ground for the
common approach in practice of employing fee schedules that generate
revenues su¤cient to cover the cost of public pollution-abatement programs.
The earmarking of pollution charges may help to achieve sustainable
development in a dynamic setting.
The article is organised as follows: the next two sections analyse these
schemes in static settings; then the discussion moves into a dynamic general
equilibrium analysis; and the ¢nal section summarises the ¢ndings.
eroded by the tax-interaction e¡ect. However, their numerical result does show that, if the
proceeds of an environmental tax are used to reduce pre-existing taxes, the gain from the
revenue-recycling e¡ect is larger than the loss from the tax-interaction e¡ect, implying a net
gain in addition to environmental improvement. Similar results can be found in studies by
Goulder et al. (1999), Parry et al. (1996) and Parry and Williams III (1999). However,
Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) report that the substitution of environmentally-motivated
taxes for traditional income taxes involves a gross cost: the double dividend does not
materialise. However, both proponents and critics of this hypothesis neglect the possibility
of earmarking.
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Suppose a ¢rm's cost function is C  Cq, where q is the quantity of its
product, with the property that C
0  0 and C
00  0. The damage caused by
pollution from the production process is D  Dq with the property that
D0  0, D
0  0 and D
00  0. A Pigouvian tax, in the form of product tax, is
set to be t
  D
0q
. It is derived on the assumption that the tax revenue is
a transfer from the ¢rm to the public, and does not change the net social
bene¢t. However, if the revenue can be used for pollution control activities,
the optimal tax rate may be di¡erent.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the pollution-eliminating function is
E  ES, where S is the spending on the pollution control project, and E is
the reduction in damage by the project in monetary terms,
2 and that
E
0  0, E
00  0, E0  0, E
00 > 0. It is clear that a pure pollution tax
scheme is not optimal if E
00 > 1. So the social planner has to choose an
appropriate level of environmental investment in addition to the tax rate.
Suppose the levy rate is t, product price is p, the ¢rm's response function to
a certain levy rate is q  qt. The social planner's problem is:
max
tS
pqt ÿ Cqt ÿ Dqt  ES ÿ S
s:t: S  tqt






0  lq  tq
0  0; 1
E
0 ÿ 1 ÿ l  0; 2
ltq ÿ S  0; l  0 if S  tq; 3
where l is the multiplier to constraint. If the constraint is binding, a fully
earmarked levy scheme is optimal, S  tqt and l  0 according to equation
(3),
3 which in turn implies E
0  1 from equation (2). Using p ÿ C
0q  t
and equation (1), the optimal tax rate can be written as:
2Usually the pollution-eliminating activity is a¡ected by the pollution level. As the model
does not specify the pollution level, we may use D as a proxy; that is, the E function could
be written as E  ES;D. If so, the optimal tax rate becomes t
  1 ÿ EDD
0=
ES  ES ÿ 1=e, where ED and ES are respectively the partial derivative of E with respect to
D and S. It is clear that the qualitative result from the simpli¢ed model does not change
although the marginal cost of pollution is adjusted to include the e¡ect on reducing
pollution.
3Accurately speaking, S  tqt and l  0 are not conditions of binding constraint
because the interior solution happens to be at the corner. However, as all revenues are used
for the environment, we include the discussion in the fully earmarked scheme.
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The above expression re£ects two e¡ects of the changes in production:
impacts on the pollution damages and on tax revenues. The ¢rst e¡ect is
captured by marginal damage cost, and the second e¡ect is relevant because
the environmental spending is ¢nanced by the pollution tax which is
a¡ected by quantity of product. Note that E
0 is the marginal direct bene¢t
of environmental investment, and E
0 ÿ 1 is the marginal net bene¢t; while
dtq=dq  dS=dq is the marginal tax revenue of production. Therefore,
E
0 ÿ 1dtq=dq or E
0 ÿ 1dS=dq is the marginal net bene¢t of environ-
mental spending caused by changes in production.
To clearly see the di¡erence between this and a Pigouvian tax, the optimal









where e  q
0tt=qt is the output elasticity of pollution levy rate. It can be
seen that the conventional Pigouvian tax rate is not likely to be justi¢ed. If
E
0 > 1, the optimal tax/levy rate is not equal to the marginal damage cost,
unless e  ÿ1. If e > ÿ1, i.e. the output is inelastic to the tax/levy rate, the
social planner can get more revenue by raising the tax rate, therefore the
optimal tax rate is above the marginal damage cost. By contrast, if the
output is elastic, the optimal tax rate will be below the marginal damage
cost. These discussions can be summarised as:
4
Result 1. If E
00 > 1, a pure Pigouvian pollution tax is not optimal. In
addition, if E
0S  1, when S  tq, a fully earmarked pollution levy
scheme is optimal. In this case, if E
0S > 1, the optimal tax/levy rate is
larger than, equal to or less than the marginal damage cost if the output is
inelastic, unit-elastic or elastic to tax/levy.
When the budget constraint is sluggish, l  0 according to equation (3)
and, using p ÿ C




0S  1. Because the budget constraint is not binding now, the decision on
environmental investment has no e¡ect on the production side. Therefore
the optimal tax rate has the usual form. In this case, only a part of the tax/
levy revenue is used for environmental purposes. Therefore neither a pure
tax scheme nor a fully earmarked levy scheme is optimal. However, if they
have the same rate, and the reduced damage or improved bene¢t is larger
than the spending, an earmarked levy system is better.
4Proofs of results are fairly easy, using just the de¢nition and ¢rst-order conditions;
therefore, they are omitted to save space and are available from the author on request.
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an earmarked pollution levy is always better than a pure pollution tax with
the same rate. Moreover, the optima of a fully earmarked pollution levy
scheme are at least as good as the optima of a pure pollution tax scheme.
The result seems trivial; however, it is important to policy-makers. In
the real world, it is often di¤cult to ¢nd enough information to decide
the optimal tax rate and optimal amount of environmental spending. The
result here suggests that they could be determined by analysing individual
projects. This was a popular practice in European countries during the
1960s and 1970s: `the authorities have employed schedules of fees that
generate revenues su¤cient to cover the costs of public pollution-
abatement programs', and this is criticised as `a most unsatisfactory
method' (Baumol et al. 1979, p. 375). However, according to the dis-
cussion here, it has ¢rm theoretical grounds.
In some countries, e.g. China, only part of the pollution charges goes to
the pollution control project; the remainder goes to local environmental
protection authorities to subsidise environmental protection personnel and
equipment. This practice is a hybrid of pollution tax and levy. The part that
is not directly used in pollution abatement can be seen as a replacement of
the general tax. It can be easily shown that this hybrid system is still better
than a pure pollution tax system.
3. Static general equilibrium analysis
3.1 The model
There are three agents in the economy. A representative ¢rm employs labour
(L ), and environmental capacity whose use may produce harmful pollutants
that have negative e¡ects on the household's utility. The environmental unit
is carefully chosen such that the environmental factor used in the ¢rm can be
represented by the pollutant emissions (D). Thus the production function
can be written as Y  fL ;D,
5;6 which has the usual properties. Suppose a
pollution tax or levy is imposed at the rate t, the wage rate is w, and the
5As the model is static at this stage, capital is not considered here for simplicity and will
be included later in the dynamic model. However, it can be shown that including capital and
other input factors will not a¡ect the analytical result.
6The usual approach to model a ¢rm's pollution and abatement activity assumes that
pollution is a useless byproduct of the production process, and under certain environmental
policies, the ¢rm is forced to abate the pollution to some extent at its cost. The current
approach also captures these properties, although the ¢rm's abatement activity is not
explicitly modelled.
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are:
7
fLL ;D  w, fDL ;D  t. 4
A representative household tries to maximise its utility subject to the budget
constraint. The utility comes from the consumption (C), leisure (~ L ), and
amenity of the environment (E). Leisure is de¢ned as the di¡erence between
total time endowment (L ) and supply of labour (L ). Therefore the utility
function can be written as:
UC;L ÿ L ;E. 5
Again, it is assumed that the utility function has the usual properties.
The household owns labour and the ¢rm, therefore its income comes from
the labour income and pro¢t of the ¢rm (pw;t). It also receives transfers
from the government (G). Thus the household's utility maximisation problem
is to choose C and L to maximise equation (5) subject to:
C  pw;t  wL  G. 6
And the ¢rst-order conditions are:
UC  l, U~ L  lw, 7
where l is the Lagrangian multiplier of constraint (6).
The government tries to maximise the social welfare which could be
represented by the household's utility function (5) through various govern-
ment instruments. One of them is the exertion of state ownership over en-
vironment; that is, it decides the supply of environment. The government
also decides how to allocate the environmental tax revenue.
Similarly to leisure, the environmental quality is de¢ned as the di¡erence
between environmental endowment (E) and supply of environmental absorp-
tion capacity of pollution (D). Investment in environment can increase the
environmental amount as well. Therefore:
E  E ÿ D  eS, 8
where S is the spending on environmental projects, and eS the pollution
abatement or environment improvement function. It is assumed that
e0  0, e
0 > 0, e
00 < 0.
In line with the above-mentioned pollution tax schemes, the government's
budget constraint has three forms: (1) under the general tax-income scheme,
7Subscript denotes the partial derivative of the function relative to that variable, e.g.
fL  @f=@L .
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8 (2) As the pure tax scheme
suggests, all revenue is transferred to household. This is equivalent to impose
one more constraint S  0. (3) If all revenue from supplying environmental
capacity is earmarked for environment, another constraint G  0 is added to
the general case.
With more constraints imposed, according to optimisation theory, neither
a pure tax scheme nor a fully earmarked levy scheme can achieve better
results than a general scheme because the feasible set for choice variables
becomes smaller.
Result 3. The optima of a pure pollution scheme and a fully earmarked
levy scheme are no better than the optimum of the general pollution tax/
income scheme.
3.2 The optimal pollution tax/bounty scheme
Outlay of pollution tax/levy
In order to compare these three schemes, the government's problem can be
set as to maximise equation (5) subject to equations (6), (8), S  G  tD,
S  0 and G  0. Government transfer (G) is set as a choice variable because
the government anticipates that G a¡ects household's income, and thus
a¡ects its utility. The household's budget constraint (6) is added in line with
this fact. The Lagrangian is:
£  UC;L ÿ L ;E ÿ D  eS  l1tD ÿ S ÿ G
 l2p  wL  G ÿ C  l3S  l4G
The corresponding ¢rst-order conditions are:
UE  l1t, UEe
0S  l1 ÿ l3,
l1  l2  l4, l3S  0, l4G  0
9
Note that both l in equation (7) and l2 in equation (9) are the marginal
utility of increasing the budget available to the household; they should
therefore be equal. A general tax-income scheme sets no limitation on S; that
is the constraint G  0 could be dropped, which is equivalent to l4  0. If
an interior solution exists under the general scheme, l3  0. Thus the above
conditions become:
UE  l1t, UEe
0S  l1, l1  l2  l 10
8Note that this constraint could end up with S > tD, therefore the transfer G could be
negative. This case will be discussed in detail later.
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scheme is justi¢ed. Then l3  0 and l4  0 as G  tD > 0, and the ¢rst-order
conditions thus become:
UE  l1t, UEe
0S  l1, l1  l2  l. 11
Using these conditions, the following result is derived:
Result 4. A pure pollution tax scheme is optimal if both the following
conditions are satis¢ed:
Condition (1) UEe








 fDL ;D  t:
The above conditions make sense and are intuitive. Because spending on
the environment will reduce the spending on consumption, the ¢rst part of
condition (1) says that it is not optimal to invest in environmental projects if
the marginal utility of environmental quality derived from environmental
spending (UEe
0S) is less than the marginal utility of consumption.
Condition (1) also compares the marginal utility of environmental invest-
ment and the marginal utility of leisure. As spending on the environment
increases, the household may want to supply more labour to increase its
whole income to support a certain amount of consumption, and thus enjoy
less leisure. fLL ;D is the marginal product of labour, 1=fLL ;D is
therefore the amount of labour needed to produce an extra (in¢nitesimal)
unit of product or income. Thus this condition says it does not pay for
society to invest in the environment if the resulting marginal utility is less
than the marginal utility of leisure forgone to recover the extra unit of
income.
Condition (2) deals with the e¤ciency of environmental investment. e
0S
is the marginal environmental output of spending on environmental projects,
so 1=e
0S is the marginal cost of environmental goods, while fDL ;D is the
marginal product or income of the environmental factor. It is not optimal to
invest in the environment if the former is greater than the latter.
It is known that e
00 is a large number because e
0S > 0 and e
00S < 0,
therefore the marginal utility of environment (UE) should be su¤ciently low
to make condition (1) hold. According to the property of the utility function,
this means that environmental quality should be very good or environmental
resources be abundant. Unfortunately, the environmental problem has be-
come a global issue and caused great concern, therefore the conditions are not
likely to be satis¢ed in the real world. As a result, a pure pollution tax system
may not be optimal.
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than the tax revenue from pollution. Because government has no other
taxation revenues, this leads to G < 0, that is, there is a net lump sum
transfer from household to government. In a model as simple as the one
presented here, it seems that transfers from household to government do not
cause much trouble. However, in the real world, government should ¢nd a
cost-free way to raise revenue beyond the pollution taxation revenue. If it
fails to do so, it may be better to set a budget constraint for government, that
is, S  tD. Clearly this will be a second-best option.
9
If the fully earmarked scheme is considered, S  tD. From S  G  tD,
this is equivalent to G  0, which implies l4  0. Therefore the equation (9)
becomes:
UE  l1t, UEe
0S  l1, l1  l2  l. 12
Then the conditions justifying an earmarking scheme can be summarised as
follows:
Result 5. All pollution tax/levy revenue should be used in environmental
projects if all of the following conditions are satis¢ed:
Condition (1) UEe


















Condition (1), which is opposed to condition (1) in Result 4, shows that it pays
for the society to increase investment in the environment if the marginal utility
of the environment resulting from environmental investment is larger than
the marginal utility of consumption, or the marginal utility of leisure forgone
to recover the spending on the environment. Conditions (2) and (3) show that
the marginal rate of substitution of consumption or leisure for environmental
amenity is larger than the related marginal rate of transformation.
These three conditions are likely to be satis¢ed when the marginal utility
of environment is high, the pollution charges and the marginal utility of
consumption are small. To apply these conditions, we can divide the world
into several groups along three dimensions: abundance of environmental
9It may be interesting to examine which one is better: spending on the environment less
than the optimum due to the budget constraint or imposing some other taxes to ¢nance the
environmental expenditure. If the latter is proved to be better, the `double-dividend hypo-
thesis' is turned upside down.
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(table 1). Possible examples of countries in certain categories are some
African countries in row one and China in row ¢ve.
Optimal pollution tax/levy rate
From ¢rst-order conditions in (4), (7) and (10), the optimal tax rate under
a general tax-income scheme can be derived as:
t











Most of the above expressions merely repeat the usual doctrines, and are
thus not worth repeating here, except t
  1=e
0; that is, the optimal tax rate
should be equal to the marginal cost of public environment-improving or
pollution-cleansing activities. It shows that the usual interpretation of
Pigouvian tax is conceptually incomplete. Typically, a Pigouvian tax rate is
set according to the marginal cost of pollution damage and, when imple-
mented, leads to identical marginal cost of pollution abatement across ¢rms.
However, it does not consider the public environmental activities. Moreover,
the relationship derived here has an important implication for policy-
making, as discussed in partial equilibrium analysis. The view is prevalent
that valuing environmental bene¢t or measuring pollution damage is highly
subjective and very di¤cult. However, it is easier to count the cost of
environmental projects. The policy-makers may be more con¢dent in policy
design if they can plan projects according to certain environmental targets
and set the pollution tax rate based on the cost analysis of these projects.
If a pure pollution tax scheme is justi¢ed, most of the relationships are
maintained except that t
  1=e
00. This has been indicated by condition (2)
of Result 4. Because the marginal cost of public environment-improving or

















Note: *Not likely to happen in the real world
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such activities; therefore the optimal tax rate is no higher than the marginal
cost of environmental projects.
If a fully earmarked pollution levy scheme is justi¢ed, it is true that
t
  fD  1=e
0tD, but t
  UE=UC  w
UE=U~ L. These have been explained
in the discussion of Result 5, but it is still worth making a couple of points.
Analogous to the case where S  0, one would expect that t  1=e
0tD
because an upper limit is put on environmental spending. However, tD is not
a ¢xed point like 0. The government chooses both D (therefore t) and S to
maximise the objective function, and thus achieve equality between the
optimal tax rate and the marginal cost of environmental project. This choice
results in an imbalance between the optimal tax rate and the marginal rates
of substitution (UE=UC and w
UE=U~ L). Unlike the pure tax scheme where
S  0 is a ¢xed value, the government has the incentive to increase the tax
revenue if the constraint on its environmental spending is binding.
3.3 Pollution tax versus emission permit
Because there is no transaction cost and uncertainty in the current model,
the government can achieve the same results through either taxing the ¢rm
at an appropriate rate or directly issuing an appropriate number of emission
permits (Weitzman 1974). However, there are still some problems with the
permit scheme in the real world.
First, if there are many ¢rms, the administrative cost of allocating permits
e¤ciently to individual ¢rms would be prohibitively high. Thus a tradeable
permit system should be developed to ensure that the permits are allocated
e¤ciently.
Second, the way in which permits are issued may make a di¡erence. As
the model implies, the household spends its income on consumption goods
only. Therefore a grandfathered emission permit system works in the same
way as a pure pollution tax scheme, while an auctioned permit system may
follow the optimal general tax-income scheme.
3.4 Pre-existing taxes and `double-dividend'
Now consider the existence of other distorting taxes. Before a pollution
tax/levy scheme was introduced, the government taxed labour income at the
rate o to ¢nance some public goods G. With this G, the utility function
now becomes:
UC;L ÿ L ;E ÿ D  eS;G. 13
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problem. To keep things simpler, and more realistic, it is assumed that tax
revenues, pollution or income tax, will not be transferred to the household.
The new ¢rst-order conditions are:
UC  l, U~ L  lw ÿ o, 14
wherelistheLagrangianmultiplierofthenewconstraintC  p  w ÿ oL .
The government chooses o, G, D and S to maximise equation (13), subject
to:
G  S  oL  tD; C  w ÿ oL  pt;w; 0  S  tD:
The second constraint is added because the government anticipates that o
a¡ects the household's budget and behaviour. The Lagrangian for this
problem is:
£  UC;L ÿ L ;E ÿ D  eS;G  l1oL  tD ÿ G ÿ S
 l2pw;t  w ÿ oL ÿ C  l3S  l4tD ÿ S.
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
UG  l1, UE  l1t  l4t, l1  l2  l,
UEe
0S  l1 ÿ l3  l4, l3S  0, l4tD ÿ S  0.
15
The relationship that l1  l2 is derived from setting the partial derivative
of the Lagrangian with respect to o equal zero and represents the fact that a
rise in the government's budget due to changing o leads to an equal decline
in the household's budget, while l2  l comes from the fact that both l2 and
l are the multiplier of the household's budget constraint when maximising
the same objective function.
If S  0, that is, the whole pollution tax revenue is used to replace the
distortional income tax, the following result is derived according to the
above conditions:
Result 6. With pre-existing labour income tax, all pollution tax/levy
revenue should be used to replace the income tax if both the following
conditions are satis¢ed:
Condition (1) UEe








 t  fD.
The ¢rst condition is similar to condition (1) in Result 4, except that the
e¡ect of labour income tax and the utility of public good are now considered.
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by tax revenue, a rise in environmental spending would reduce the funds
available to the public good. Therefore, if the marginal utility from an
in¢nitesimal change in environmental spending is less than the marginal
utility of the public good, no tax revenue should be used in environmental
projects; that is, all the revenue from the pollution tax should be used to
replace the labour income tax. Because of the existence of income tax, the
marginal income of labour received by the household should be adjusted by
extracting the tax rate o, and UEe
00  U~ L= fL ÿ o states that if the
marginal utility of an in¢nitesimal environmental spending is less than the
marginal utility of leisure forgone to recover that extra unit of income, the
environmental spending is not justi¢ed, thus all pollution tax revenue should
be used to replace labour income tax.
On the other hand, if S  tD is justi¢ed, a fully earmarked scheme is
desirable, and it is likely to ¢nance environmental spending by increasing
income tax. The conditions are given in the following statement:
Result 7. With pre-existing labour income tax, all pollution tax/levy
revenue should be earmarked for environmental purposes if both the
following conditions are satis¢ed:
Condition (1) UEe













 t  fD.
These conditions are similar to those given in Result 5, except that the
marginal labour income is adjusted due to the tax and the marginal utility of
the public good is considered. The new terms in conditions of Result 7 indicate
that a fully earmarked pollution levy scheme is justi¢ed if the marginal utility
from environmental spending is larger than the marginal utility of public
good and if the marginal rate of substitution of environmental good for
public good is larger than the marginal product of environmental good.
Checking the situation that usually holds in practice against the
conditions, it may be found that those in Result 6 are likely to be violated,
while those in Result 7 are not. Therefore, the basis for the `double-dividend
hypothesis' is eroded. However, another version of the `double-dividend
hypothesis' may be proposed. Even without using the revenue to replace pre-
existing taxes, the environmental tax might help to reduce the distortion of
labour income tax through a substitution e¡ect. After the environmental tax
is imposed, the environmental factor is more expensive than before, so the
¢rm may demand more labour, that is, the income tax base is enlarged.
Given G, this leads to a less distorting labour income tax rate.
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In the real world, the environment is a stock of certain elements and provides
a £ow of services, of which absorbing pollutants is one. More importantly,
the environment itself has the capacity of natural assimilation which may
a¡ect earmarking in environmental projects. Therefore the above results
should be examined in a dynamic setting.
4.1 The model
The framework is a modi¢ed Ramsey model with environment arguments
in both production and utility functions. Like the static general equilibrium
analysis, there are three agents in this model.
The ¢rm employs three factors: labour, capital and environmental
absorption capacity. The e¡ective labour is increasing at an exogenous,
constant rate n, and economy-wide variables are normalised by this e¡ective
labour level.
10 Capital is accrued by investment (i) made by the ¢rm, and
depreciated at a constant rate d:
_ kt  it ÿ d  nkt 16
Assume the production function is constant returns to scale, so the output
per e¡ective labour unit is fkt;dt. If a pollution tax is imposed at rate t, the
¢rm's instantaneous pro¢t is pt  fkt;dt ÿ it ÿ wt ÿ ttdt. It chooses i and d
to maximise its intertemporal pro¢t
R 1
t pse
ÿrsÿnsÿtds, subject to the con-
straint given by equation (16).
The representative household owns the ¢rm, supplies labour, and receives
dividends and government transfers. It can also borrow and lend at the rate r
to ¢nance its spending on consumption. The dynamic budget constraint is
therefore:
_ at  r ÿ nat  wt  vt ÿ ct, 17
where ais the household's assetsand vis government transfer.The household's
debt should also meet the No-Ponzi-Game condition limt!1 ate
ÿrÿnt  0.






subject to equation (17).
The government collects pollution tax from the ¢rm and allocates it on
environmental spending and transfers. It is assumed that the government
does not accrue any asset or debt, that is:
10Following convention, lower case letters are used to denote these variables.
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The environmental stock is eroded by pollution, and improved by
environmental investment, while the environment itself has natural
assimilation ability:
11
_ et  het  gst ÿ net ÿ dt, 20
where e is environmental stock, d is pollutant discharge, h is the natural
assimilation function of the environment, and g is the provision function
by environmental investment. It is assumed these functions have the usual
properties.
The government chooses paths of dt, st and vt to maximise the inter-
temporal social welfare represented by equation (18) subject to equations
(17), (19) and (20). Constraint (17) is included because the government
anticipates that its spending on the environment a¡ects the household's
budget, and thus utility.
4.2 Analytical results
The current Hamiltonian and ¢rst-order conditions for the above model are
reported in table 2. Using these results, the conditions to justify pure tax and
fully earmarked schemes are derived.
Result 8. Along the optimal path, a pure tax scheme is adopted if
l1tg
00  l2g
00  uc and 1=g
00  fdk;d  t at every time; and a fully
earmarked scheme is optimal if l1  l2g
0sjstd  uc, and t  1=g
0sjstd at
every time.
These conditions are virtually the same as those in the static model. Note
that l1 is the marginal value of objective function (i.e. marginal utility) if the
government budget is increased exogenously by one in¢nitesimal unit, l2 is
the marginal utility of environmental stock, g
0s is the marginal environ-
mental product of investment; therefore l2g
0s and l1tg
0s are the marginal
utility of environmental spending, with the former arising through a direct
increase in environmental stock and the latter through savings in government
spending. It is clear that no tax revenue should be used in environmental
projects if the marginal utility of such spending is less than the marginal
utility of consumption. If the condition is reversed when all tax revenue is
used in environmental projects, a fully earmarked scheme is justi¢ed.
It should be pointed out that these conditions do not imply that the
11Pollution stock is not used as the state variable because, at the steady state, the total
pollution stock will increase at the rate n, which is not a desirable result.
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It is possible to shift from one to another.
The steady state is summarised in table 3. In deriving these results, the
relations wt  fkt;dt ÿ fkkt ÿ tdt and at  kt are used. The ¢rst comes from
the assumption of constant returns to scale production. The second comes
from the fact that, in equilibrium, there is neither lending nor borrowing
(Blanchard and Fischer 1989, p. 50). These results are similar to those of
static general equilibrium analysis.
Because a pure pollution tax can only reduce demand for the environment,
rather than increase its supply, it may be unstable in the dynamic process.
However, environmental investment can increase the environmental stock
and thus may help to improve stability, and is likely to achieve sustainable
growth. A simple example is presented to demonstrate this. Suppose the
Table 2 First-order conditions for dynamic problem
Agent Current Hamiltonian First-order condition
¢rm fk;d ÿ i ÿ w ÿ td fd  t; fk  r  d; l0  1;
l0i ÿ d  nk _ k  i ÿ d  nk
household uc;e  lr ÿ na  w uc  l; _ l  y ÿ rl;
v ÿ c _ a  r ÿ na  w  v ÿ c
government uc;e  l1td ÿ s ÿ v l1t  l2; l1  l  l4,
lr ÿ na  w  v ÿ c l1  l2g
0  l3,
l2he  gs ÿ ne ÿ d l3s  0; l4v  0,
l3s  l4v _ l2  y ÿ h
0l2 ÿ ue,
_ e  he  gs ÿ ne ÿ d
Table 3 Steady state of general tax/income scheme
s  0 0 < s < td s  td
1=g
0s  fdk;d 1=g
0s  fdk;d 1=g
0s  fdk;d
Uc fd  Ue=y ÿ h
0 Uc fd  Ue=y ÿ h




0 Uc  Ueg
0=y ÿ h
0 Uc  Ueg
0=y ÿ h
0
fk  y  d fk  y  d fk  y  d
fk;d  d  nk  c fk;d  d  nk  c  s fk;d  d  nk  c  s
he  ne  d gs  he  ne  d gs  he  ne  d
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to equation (20), if there is no environmental investment, e will decrease
forever, and a steady state cannot be found. However, when environmental
investment is made, the steady state is possible.
5. Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the usual interpretation of the Pigouvian tax
is misleading. An optimal pollution tax/levy program should include the
possibility of spending the revenue on environment-improving or pollution-
cleansing projects, that is, earmarking. A pure tax scheme cannot do better
than a general tax-income or `tax-bounty' scheme and, in fact, is not su¤-
cient for an optimum. This article also investigates the conditions for a pure
tax system and for earmarking all pollution tax/levy revenues into environ-
mental projects. A pure tax system might be an optimum only if the marginal
utility of environment is su¤ciently small; that is, environmental resources
are abundant. However, this situation is rare in practice. By contrast, a fully
earmarked system is more likely to be a better choice when the marginal
utility of environment is high, relative to that of consumption, and the
pollution tax/levy revenue is small.
Conventionally, it is accepted that a Pigouvian pollution tax is set equal
to the marginal damage cost of the negative externality. However, it is found
that this is not necessarily optimal if the tax revenue can be used for
environmental purposes. In the general equilibrium setting, under the general
tax-income scheme, the optimal pollution tax rate is equal to the marginal
cost of producing environmental goods and services. This may imply that
less information than usually thought is required to design an e¤cient tax
policy. Even in a partial setting, if all revenue is to be used in an environ-
mental project, it is not necessary to fully internalise pollution damage to
reach an optimum, and the optimal tax rate might be di¡erent from the
marginal damage cost.
In the case with pre-existing distorting taxes, using all the pollution tax/levy
revenue to replace the distorting taxes is usually not optimal. At least some
of the revenue from the pollution tax/levy should be used in environmental
activities. Considering the current situation, it is likely to be optimal to
earmark the whole pollution tax/levy revenue into environmental projects.
These static results survive in the steady state of a dynamic setting.
Moreover, because a pure pollution tax can only reduce the demand for
environment, rather than increase its supply, a pure pollution tax may be
unstable in the dynamic process. However, using the revenue from the tax
for environmental investment may help to improve the stability, and be likely
to achieve sustainable growth.
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